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Abstract 
The paper reports on the behavior of markets in which a transactions cost is imposed in
the form of a tax on bids and asks that are tendered in the market. That is, in the markets 
studied communication with the other side of the market was costly. The markets were 
nonstationary in the sense that market demand and market supply shifted unpredictably 
each period and the markets were organize<lby the computerized Multiple Unit Double 
Auction. The results are as follow. (1) A market equilibration process is observed across
the periods of nonstationary markets. (2) The imposition of the cost on offers did not 
negate the,tendency toward market equilibration but the price discovery process was 
"incomplete" relative to the free offer case. (3) Price equilibration with the offer cost was 
slower and efficiencies were reduced. 
Costly Offers and the Equilibration Properties 
of the Multiple Unit Double Auction 
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INTRODUCTION 
The primary focus of this study is the effect of a transaction cost on the equilibration 
properties of an otherwise competitive market. Does the existence of a transaction cost 
prevent convergence? Does it necessarily cause a change of the price to which the system 
converges? Theoretically the answer is yes if the transaction cost is sufficiently high or 
possibly if the transaction cost is embedded in the market institutions or organization in a 
manner that alters the nature of the game. However, if the transaction cost is not 
sufficiently high to prevent marginal trades and if the market is of a form that readily 
"discovers" the competitive equilibrium price, the answer is unknown even theoretically. 
In part, the open question stems from the fact that we have no solid theory about the price
discovery process of markets and the convergence features of market equilibration. This 
study poses the question for the multiple unit double auction with a hope that the data will 
reveal some insights about the process with which the competitive price is discovered 
within this form of organization. 
The multiple unit double auction organization is a natural mechanism for which the study 
of transactfons costs can be posed. This particular mechanism has some of the major 
features of almost all other mechanisms. It is known that the evolution of price to the 
competitive equilibrium occurs with great reliability. Gains from trade become exhausted. 
Furthermore, modem experimental technology facilitates a detailed study of its operation 
and the mediums through which the consequences of costly offers might become manifest. 
The organization of the research is to create a series of multiple unit double auction 
markets that are identical in every respect except for the particular subjects that are 
1 A special acknowledgment is due to the National Science Foundation and to the Caltech Laboratory for
Experimental Economics and Political Science for funding support that made these experiments possible. 
This paper evolved from a project originating in the Caltech seminar on experimental economics. The 
comments of the students in the seminar have been especially helpful. We wish to thank graduate
students John Keeling and Tanya Rosenblat of M.I.T., and undergraduate Theodore L. Turocy III of 
Caltech, for their help with the statistical computations. 
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participating and whether or not a cost is imposed on the process of making contracts. In 
particular, in some experiments bids, asks and contracts are freely tendered and executed 
without the imposition of any cost other than perhaps the subjective cost that accompanies 
the pressing of computer keys and devoting attention to the screens to process any 
information that might exist in the market. In other experiments a cost of making an offer 
was imposed. That is, any agent that tendered a bid was required to pay a cost of taking 
the action. Likewise any agent that tendered an ask was required to pay a cost of taking 
the action. Accepting the ask of a seller that had paid the cost of making the ask imposed 
no cost on the buyer. Likewise accepting a bid that had been tendered by a buyer imposed 
no cost on the seller. Thus, in the costly offer condition a cost was imposed on any agent 
that made the offer but no cost was involved in accepting an offer. So the cost was not on 
the transaction itself but on making an offer that lead to the transaction. In the free offer 
condition no cost was imposed on any bid, ask or the acceptance of a bid or ask. 
The markets under consideration involved a shift of demand and supply (up or down) each 
period by non-constant amounts. Thus the price in any one period gave no indication of 
the price that might exist the next period. Furthermore, the redemption values and costs 
of each individual changed each period so the sheets of incentives given an individual 
could not be used to obtain information easily about what the competitive equilibrium 
price might be for the period. Thus the markets under consideration did not have the 
stationary property that is often studied and within which equilibration is commonly 
observed. The study of markets within such constantly and unpredictably changing 
environments has not been done so that feature of the experiments also offers something 
new. 
The experiments thus are an attempt to uncover some of the features of the nature of 
market convergence and are a step in the investigation of the mystery of the price 
discovery process. Specifically four questions are posed. 
(1) Does equilibration occur in a constantly changing environment? If no tendency exists 
for equilibration within a period, then learning across periods may not occur and market 
prices could wander randomly. 
(2) Does equilibration occur in the presence of an offer cost? Such equilibration need not 
occur since the terms of offers in a bargaining process can be influenced by which party 
made the bid or ask. Anticipation of the fact that the other side might not want to bear the 
cost of another round of bidding might induce parties to offer on more self serving terms. 
Prices could therefore gyrate depending upon which side made the offer. 
(3) If equilibration occurs, are the equilibrium magnitudes themselves influenced by the 
existence of the costly offer? The magnitudes are prices, volumes and efficiencies. Since 
the predictions of game theory can differ from demand and supply models, one might even 
expect that the equilibration be at something other than a competitive equilibrium. 
(4) Is the speed of equilibration influenced by the costly offer? 
The paper is organized into four sections, including this introduction. The second section 
contains the parameters and experimental design. Since the operations of the multiple unit 
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double auction are well known very little space is devoted to a description of the 
institution or the associated experimental setting. The third section is a brief discussion of 
the competitive model and some of the relevant behavioral properties of markets. The 
fourth section contains the major results and the final section contains a summary of 
conclusions. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PARAMETERS 
The general structure of the experiments is contained in Table 1. All parameters, including 
the time within each period, were maintained identically across six experiments. Each of 
the six experiments consisted of a double auction market mechanism, with three buyers 
and three sellers. The redemption values and costs were symmetric . The magnitudes for 
the parameters used during the first period of any experiment are contained in Figure 1. 
Each experiment had ten periods after the first period, except the first experiment, which 
had twelve periods. Subjects were students and staff from the California Institute of 
Technology who had previous experience in the operation of computerized MUDA 
markets but had no experience with the parameters or procedures of the experiments 
reported here. 
There were three types of buyers and sellers, one of each in each period. The assignment 
of values to each of the buyer and seller types for period one of an experiment are in 
Figure 1. The actual table of numbers , the redemption values for buyers and costs for 
sellers, for each type and for period one are in Table 2-a. The individual subjects rotated 
among type . For example, a subject who was type 3 in period 2 became type 1 in pe1iod 
3, type 2 in period 4 and was again type 3 in period 5. The individual schedules each 
period differed by a constant amount that is listed at the bottom of Table 2-b. For 
example, to get the schedules for all types in period 2 add a constant of -40 to the values 
of each entry of each schedule. The constant listed in Table 2-b is - 40 so the difference 
between periods one and two is that in period two each of the schedules is shifted 
downward by 40. In order to calculate the schedules for period 3 the constant of -200 
must be added to each of the values that were computed for period 1, etc. 
Thus, the changes in values and rotation that occurred each period made it very difficult 
for an individual to detect the nature of the general changes in demand and supply from 
the information on the incentive sheet. However, close examination and a comparison of 
periods would have revealed much. The sheets were presented in a manner that prevented 
an individual participating in any one period from knowing what the next period incentive 
parameter values might be. However, past parameters of an individual were available to 
that individual, which , if studied carefully, would contain information. Our belief is that 
these relationships went unnoticed by subjects. 
For three of the six experiments, a cost of offering was introduced. This was a cost of 10 
francs (generally about $0.25) for each bid or ask, i.e. each offer made in the market. The 
acceptance of a bid or ask did not incur the cost, nor was there any additional cost if 
quantities larger than one were offered. These costly offers are analogous to charging a 
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fee for market entry, advertising cost for reaching a buyer or for modeling transportation 
costs of getting units to or from the market. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to be either a buyer or seller and to a seat at a computer. 
Each had an identical instruction sheet (see the Appendix). The instructions were passed 
out and then read aloud. Subjects in the costly offer condition had a box on their incentive 
sheet that said "postings" and were told to put a mark for each time they submitted a bid 
or ask which was accepted by the market. Bids or asks for multiple units counted only as 
one offer. At the end of each period subjects were to count their total number of offers 
and mark this on the sheet, subtracting 10 francs for each offer from their profit 
Subsequent checks of the data verified the accuracy of these recordings. 
All subjects were familiar with the basic market operation, so only a single practice period 
was necessary. After this practice session subjects were told that they were making 
decisions for actual money, and this continued for ten periods, with small breaks in 
between for accounting purposes. No subject knew that the experiment would last only 
ten periods until the last period was completed, at which time they were told to compute 
their total profits. 
MODELS AND BEHAVIORAL PROPERTIES 
The demand and supply and resulting competitive equilib1ium for the first period of each 
experiment are in Figure 1. The demand and supply curves were shifted each period by a 
constant and as a result the competitive equilibrium prices differed each period and are 
produced in Table 3. A theoretical competitive equilibrium volume of nine units was the 
same across all periods and experiments. 
Whether or not the market will "discover" the equilibrium price each period under 
conditions of unanticipated shifts of demand and supply is substantially unknown. The 
equilibration properties of constantly shifting markets have been studied but in previous 
studies the shifting properties themselves had a constant property. For example Daniels 
and Plott (1988) studied markets in which the demand shifted up each period by a 
constant percentage. Williams (1979) studied demands and supplies that had a constant 
cyclical behavior. In both cases the data suggest that markets converge to such "moving 
targets" but the case in which the target has little predictability from the past has not been 
studied. The consequences of one time shifts in markets has been often studied but the 
constantly shifting markets studied here is new. Thus, the data from the experiments with 
free offers will add new information about the convergence capacities of markets. 
The existence of influences of certain types of transactions costs in experimental markets 
in well known and documented. Plott and Smith (1978) demonstrated that a natural 
transactions cost exists in experimental markets that can easily influence the volume 
component of an equilibrium. If agents are given no commission for trades and if the
demand limit price for the marginal unit is exactly equal to the supply limit price of the 
marginal unit of supply, then these two units tend not to trade. The transaction cost can 
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be seen as restricting volume. The existence and implications of this natural transaction 
cost and certain undesirable properties of commissions to overcome it, lead to the use of 
parameters with an equilibrium "tunnel" property. The limit price of the marginal 
demander is typically strictly higher than the limit price of the marginal supplier so the 
possibility of strictly positive gains from trade exist at the margin. 
Refer again to the demand and supply model in Figure 1. As discussed above the 
magnitudes were for period one parameters. As can be seen there is a "tunnel" twenty 
francs wide for the last two units, before supply and demand crossed. Thus, strictly 
speaking all prices in the range of the tunnel are equilibria. For purposes of discussion it is 
easy to discuss THE equilibrium and for this purpose the average price of the equilibria is 
used. That is, when the discussion refers to THE equilibrium price, the reference is to 
the middle of the tunnel. The equilibrium prices listed in Table 3 are these numbers. 
As was mentioned above, the tunnel is customary because it is known that marginal units 
do not trade without some sort of reward. The pa1ticular "tunnel" represented by the 
parameters of the experiments and contained in Figure 1, is rather large given ordinary 
beliefs about subjective transaction costs. In the experiments to be studied here the gains 
from trade between marginal units are about $0.50 per unit as compared with the usual 
$0.05 implemented in experimental markets. The size of this "tunnel" means that even 
with the cost of offering of 10 francs or about $0.25 , there were prices that made a profit 
for both buyer and seller at every unit up to the competitive equilibrium quantity. Thus, 
even with the costly offers there were always gains from trade over a price range of about 
$0.25, which is well above what is ordinarily believed to be subjective transaction cost. 
After having looked at the data, aspects of theory emerged that might be helpful in 
understanding what is observed in the convergence processes. These are regularities in 
the data that are understandable from a special theoretical point of view. In order to 
emphasize their importance we will refer to them as principles. This discussion has 
emerged after we studied the markets so the design cannot be construed as an attempt to 
test the ideas in some systematic way. Nevertheless, it is easier to discuss the ideas now, 
during a discussion of the models rather than later. 
The behavior of the double auction in general, without costly offers, seems to conform to 
a PRINCIPLE OF SUCCESSFUL PRICE DISCOVERY. That means that during the 
operation of a market the prices at which trades can take place become widely known. All 
buyers know a range of prices that is clearly out of bounds because the sellers cannot or 
will not take less. Similarly sellers have a similar idea about what buyers are willing to 
take. Under such circumstances the placing of an order that is a likely candidate for 
execution is not a particularly difficult or artful task. In a sense the set of mutually 
beneficial net trades becomes public information. The path-breaking paper of Easley and 
Ledyard (1993) axiomatize a behavioral quality that can lead to such a property. They 
postulate that as the end of a period draws near, a tendency exists for individuals to reveal 
their limit prices in their offers. That is, for Easley and Ledyard the principle of successful 
price discovery operates through a PRINCIPLE OF FULL REVELATION. 
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The double auction has another property that was partially captured by an Easley and 
Ledyard axiom. For lack of a better term we will call it the PRINCIPLE OF 
IMMEDIATE ACCEPTANCE. As a period grows near the end, a tendency exists for 
individuals to accept whatever offer exists in the market if the offer is profitable for them. 
They wish to accept the terms immediately while the offer lasts and before the period 
ends. 
Together the two principles capture much of the nature of the trading process. The area 
of gains from trade becomes known, especially near the end of a period. Furthermore, it 
becomes easier to tender offers that will be accepted as the principle of immediate 
acceptance takes over. No individual will fail to trade because of strategic reasons. Thus 
all gains form trade will be exhausted and the market volume will be at the competitive 
equilibrium quantity. 
RESULTS 
Figures 2 and 3 contain examples of the time series of contract prices for experiments with 
free offers (Figure 2, Experiment 0524) and with costly offers (Figure 3, Experiment 
0217). The vertical lines indicate the different periods. The horizontal lines indicate the 
competitive equilibrium price for each period as calculated from parameters. The visual 
impression taken from these figures is that convergence occurs under both conditions but 
it is faster and more accurate under the condition of free offers as opposed to the 
condition of costly offers. The conclusions below will make that impression precise. 
The first result is that convergence to the competitive equilibrium is occurring within each 
period even with the parameters shifting. Interestingly enough, in this case of 
unpredictable shifts the convergence to the competitive equilibrium does seem to improve 
with experience in the market. This occurs under conditions of free offers and also under 
conditions of costly offers. 
RESULT 1. Under both conditions of free offers and costly offers the within period 
convergence of contract prices is to the equilibrium. Furthermore, there are slight 
improvements over time. 
SUPPORT. The analysis will proceed by an examination of the case of free offers, and 
then will focus on the costly offer case. Table 4 contains the results of the estimation of 
the Ashenfelter/El-Gamai2 model of market convergence.
Pit - P
eq
it =Li Di Bli 1/t + B2 (t-1)/t + eit
Where i is the experiment and t is the period. Pit is the average price of a contract in 
period t of experiment i. Di takes value 1 if the experiment is i and zero otherwise. P
eq
it
2 This model was first used in Noussair, Riezman and Plott (forthcoming) and resulted from discussions 
with and suggestions of Orley Aschenfelter and Mahmoud El-Gamal. 
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is the equilibrium price (the midpoint of a range) predicted by the competitive model in 
period t of experiment i. The eITor term is assumed to be normal with 0 mean and constant 
variance. The Table contains the results of estimation for the two data sets. 
The coefficient B2 is an estimate of the asymptotic behavior of the time series that is to 
be compared with the equilibrium predictions of the competitive model. Given the 
parameters of the model, there is a "window" of 20 francs or equilibrium &rices. Peq is
the midpoint of this window. Thus prices of 10 francs on either side of Pe are still
equilibria. 
For the case of free offers B2 is estimated to be 9.7 francs which is approximately 20 
cents. This is within the 10 franc difference that is allowed by the non-uniqueness of the 
equilibrium prices. Thus we can conclude that experiments with free offers are converging 
to the equilibrium prices. A comparison of the data in the initial periods , the B 1i terms, 
further supports the conclusion of convergence. These terms estimate the initial starting 
points of the contract prices during the first period of the experiment. As can be seen two 
of the three experiment's price levels during the first periods were outside the equilibrium 
price range. Volumes are reported in Table 5 and as can be determined by inspection the 
equilibrium volume of 9 was attained in eighty percent of the periods. 
The results of the experiments with costly offers are similar. As can be seen from an 
examination of Table 4 the estimate of B2 is - 0.46 which is not significantly different from 
zero. Thus the convergence of these markets is to the competitive equilibrium price. An 
examination of the B 1i terms demonstrates that the prices in the initial periods of two of 
the three experiments are outside the equilibrium price range. The volumes in Table 5 are 
at the competitive equilibrium level of 9 units in seventeen percent of the periods (as 
opposed to eighty percent for the free offer condition). This divergence of the volume 
from the model will be discussed in detail later.• 
The data presented above might lead to the impression that the costly offer markets are 
actually converging faster than are the free offer markets. The B2 term for the costly offer 
case is almost zero, the middle of the competitive equilibria, whereas the measurement for 
the free offer case is nearer the boundary of the equilibria. The next result demonstrates 
that such an impression is not cmTect. The free offer markets converge more rapidly and 
are more efficient. The apparent relative success of the costly offer markets is probably 
due to the accident of the pattern of first period prices and the nature of the averaging 
process implicit in the statistical model. The next result summarizes some of the major 
effects of the costly offer on market performance. 
RESULT 2. The imposition of a cost of offers lowers market efficiency, reduces volume 
and reduces the speed of convergence to the competitive equilibrium. 
SUPPORT. The properties of the data will be explored in the order of efficiency, volume 
and speed. The efficiencies of each period of each experiment are contained in Table 6. 
On average the efficiency of the free offer experiments is 97.2% and on average the 
7 
efficiency level of the costly offer experiments is 91.9 %. Notice that the average 
efficiency of the free offer experiments is heavily influenced by one period of one 
experiment (It might have been due to a typo of a type that sometimes occur in electronic 
markets.). If this one period is removed from the data then the efficiency of the free offer 
case is on average 99.1 %.  With or without the "outlier" a test of a difference in efficiency 
levels between the two treatment conditions (free offer or costly offer) leads to a rejection 
of the hypothesis of equal means at the 0.02 level with the "outlier" and at the 0.01 level 
without it. The markets with costly offers operated less efficiently than did the markets 
with free offers. 
Table 5 contains the volume in each period of each experiment. The competitive 
equilibrium volume should be nine units in any given period. The volume in the free offer 
experiments is on average 9.1 per period. The volume in the costly offer experiments is 
on average 7.8 per period. The hypothesis of equality can be rejected at the .01 level 
Since the average volume of the free offer case is above the average volume in the costly 
offer case we conclude that the impact of the costly offer is to lower volume. 
Speed of convergence is measured by the following model. 
I P.. peq .. , rv - Pt+ £ ..t I]t - 1J = ..,,, e IJ 
The variable Pijt is the t
th contract that occurred in period j of experiment i. The variable
Peqij is the competitive equilibrium price that prevailed during that period of the
experiment. The use of the absolute value is used to measure the distance from the 
equilibrium and the form of the model implies that if the direction is toward the 
equilibrium on average then in the limit the difference will be zero. The p term measures 
the speed of convergence. If it is positive then the system is going toward zero and if it is 
large and positive then it is moving quickly toward zero. The comparison of speed of 
convergence is thus made with the comparison of p in the different experiments. 
The estimated coefficients of the model are contained in Table 7. For the free offer case 
the P is estimated to be 0.12 and for the costly offer case the estimate is 0.05. Thus the 
speed of convergence in the free offer case is greater. The confidence in the difference is 
approximately 0.01. • 
The next 2 results form the basis of conjectures about the mechanism through which the 
effects of the imposition of offer costs become manifest. Figures 4 and 5 contain a time 
series of offers for the two conditions of free offers and costly offers respectively. The 
contracts are omitted so only the patterns of bids and asks remain. The figures give two 
impressions. First the number of offers is much greater under the conditions of free offers. 
Secondly the "bargaining" activity in terms of new bids and asks continues with a flurry 
until the very end of the market period in the free offer case. On the other hand the 
density of activity in terms of bids and asks at the final moments of a period are much 
fewer when costly offers are imposed. The next two results make those impressions 
precise. 
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RESULT 3. The imposition of an offer cost reduces the number of offers and increases 
the quantity tendered in any given offer. However, the average size of a contract is not 
influenced by the existence of costly offers. 
SUPPORT. Table 8 contains for each period of each experiment the number of offers (the 
number of bids plus the number of asks in a period),the average quantity offered and the 
average size of a contract each period . In the free offer case there are on average 51 
offers per period. In the costly offer case there were on average 9. The difference in 
numbers of offers is dramatic in magnitude and significant at the 0.01 level. The number of 
offers falls with the imposition of the cost of offers. The table also contains the average 
size of offers which is 1.2 in the case of the free offer and is 1.9 in the case of the costly 
offers. The size of offers is significantly greater ( 0.01 level of significance) in the costly 
offer case than the free offer case. As can be seen in the table the average size of 
contracts is almost uniformly 1 in all cases (on average the size of contracts is 1.02 in the 
free offer case and 1.03 in the costly offer case).• 
RESULT 4. The time left in the period at the last transaction increases as a result of the 
imposition of the costly offer and the number of offers after the last contract decreases as 
a result of the imposition of costly offers. 
SUPPORT. Table 9 reports the difference in the time at which the last contract was made 
in a pedod and the time at which the period ended. The table also reports the number of 
offers that were made after the last contract. As can be seen from examination of the table 
the average time remaining after the last contract was 21.1 seconds in the case of the free 
offer experiments and was on average 73.5 seconds in the experiments with the costly 
offer. The difference is significant at the 0.01 level. The number of offers that occurred 
after the last contract was on average 2.8 in the case of free offers and it was on average 
0.7 in the case of the costly offers. Again the difference is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Thus the imposition of costly offers had the effect of increasing the amount of time 
between the occurrence of the last transaction and the end of the period and also 
decreasing the number of offers after the last transaction was made.• 
OBSERVATION: In both the cases of free offers and costly offers conditions, at the end 
of the period profitable trades are not possible at the prices that are offered. 
SUPPORT. The observation is true of all periods of all experiments with the exceptions 
of period two of experiment 0524 and period 8 of experiment 0506. However, in these 
two cases the offer was made only within the final three and two seconds of the period 
respectively, so even in these two cases the observation tends to hold because there was, 
practically speaking, too little time remaining in the period to accept. There are many 
cases in which offers that would have left zero profits for the accepting party were left on 
the table, which is typical of the subjective transaction cost discovered by Plott and 
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Smith.• 
CONJECTURE: The costly offer induces an incomplete price discovery process. The 
principle of successful price discove1y is never fully operating. The principle of 
immediate acceptance is operative but the principle of full revelation is not operating. 
The story that supports the conjecture is a straight-forward recounting of the results listed 
above. In the absence of costly offers, convergence to the competitive equilibrium price 
and quantity can be expected. In addition the system will operate at near 100% efficiency. 
The imposition of costly offers facilitates a general fall in the level of efficiency. Gains 
from trade are left on the table. This tendency to walk away from gains from trade is not 
due to an (perhaps strategic) unwillingness to trade. The cost on offers results in a 
reduction in the number of offers (but not the willingness to trade at a given price). It also 
reduces the propensity for offers to be encouraged by the approach of the end of the 
period. In other words, the Easley and Ledyard principle of full revelation is not at 
work. 
At least two different models can be used to explain any reduction in limit price revelation. 
The first might be a simple search model that postulated an additional cost on search will 
reduce the amount of search in terms of offers that are made. A reduction in the number 
of offers is a reduction in the completeness of the price discove1y process. The second has 
more of a bargaining flavor which has the two individuals engaged in a prisoner's dilemma 
over which one will bear the cost and tender the offer. The result is an offer by neither. 
The conjecture above implicitly suggests that the phenomena of incomplete price 
discovery is due to the foimer mechanism. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study was motivated by a series of questions the answers to which can now be 
summarized. First, the price discovery process typical of stationary markets extends 
itself to markets with no stationary properties. This is a particularly interesting result 
because it suggests that convergence to an equilibrium is due in part to what might be 
learned (or coordinated) with the particular individuals in the market in addition to 
knowledge about the particular parameters that might be present in the environment. This 
conclusion is particularly interesting because learning is generally thought to involve only 
information about environmental parameters and not about the complexities that might 
accompany particular individuals or individuals as a group. 
It could be said that the equilibration properties observed are due to the fact that the
competitive equilibrium was an "easy shot". That is, the equilibrium range was wide and 
the volumes were small relative to environments in which accuracy is ordinarily studied. 
The equilibrium "window" was $0.50 as opposed to $0.20 that is frequently used. To this 
criticism we have no real reply. It is not exactly obvious how to translate the criticism into
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a program of experimentation without additional theory to guide the effort. To this end 
some speculations about theory are included at the end of the section of results. 
The second question posed was related to the impact of costly offers. The existence of 
costly offers does not negate the tendency for the price to equilibrate. Gyrations, 
breakdown of trade, or other extreme phenomena were not observed. The prices tended 
to equilibrate at a level near the competitive equilibrium. By comparison with the free 
offer case, the price convergence process was slower and the market efficiency was lower 
in the costly offer case. These questions of comparative performance were the third and 
fourth questions initially posed and are now answered. 
In addition, a type of paradox presents itself. If prices under the costly offer conditions
converge to the competitive equilibrium how can it be that costly offers produce market 
inefficiencies? A conjecture is offered in the results section as a solution to the paradox. 
The conjecture is that the case of costly offers is one of incomplete price discovery 
fostered by the reduced search. The cost of offers reduces the number of offers and as a 
result, the ability of buyers and sellers to find each other is hampered. Even though the 
prices are in the range of the competitive equilibrium, this fact is not known to the agents 
who refrain from making offers for fear of "missing" the area of gains from trade and 
thereby suffering the offer cost with no offsetting gain. Thus, the conjecture has roots in 
an intuitive theory that is captured by the Easley and Ledyard model of the convergence 
process and thereby supports that model as central to an understanding of the price 
discovery process. Specifically, the imposition of the offer cost causes violations of the 
Easily and Ledyard axiom that we have named the Principle of Full Revelation, and 
accordingly, the inefficiencies are fostered by a reduction of information in the market. 
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APPENDIX A 
The instructions for both treatments are contained below. The costly offer condition 
differed from the free offer condition only by the insertion of the sentences in the 
brackets [ ] . 
INSTRUCTIONS 
GENERAL 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are 
simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn money 
which will be paid to you in cash 
In this experiment we are going to conduct a market in which some of you will be buyers 
and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of market days or trading periods. Enclosed 
with the instructions you will find a sheet labeled Buyer or Seller, which describes the 
value to you of any decisions you might make. You are not to reveal this information to 
anyone. It is your own private information. 
The currency in these markets is francs. Each franc is worth __ dollars to you. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO BUYERS 
During each market period you are free to purchase from any seller or sellers as many 
units as you might want. For the first unit that you are buying during a trading period 
you will receive the amount listed in row (1) marked Redemption Value under Unit 
Number 1: if you buy a second unit you will receive the additional amount listed in row 
(4) marked Redemption Value under Unit Number 2, etc. The profits from each 
purchase (which are yours to keep) are computed by taking the difference between the 
redemption value and transaction cost, or purchase price, of the unit bought. That is, 
[your earnings= (redemption value) - (transaction cost)]. 
Suppose, for example, that you buy two units and that your redemption value for the first 
unit is 200 and for the second unit is 180. If you pay 150 for your first unit and 160 for
the second unit, your earnings are: 
earnings from first = 200 -150 = 50 
earnings from second = 180 -160 = 20 
total earnings = 50 + 20 = 70 
The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. The purchase price of the first 
unit you buy during the first period should be recorded on row (2) at the time of 
13
purchase. You should then record the profits on this purchase as directed on row (3). [At 
the end of the period record your total number of postings, find the posting fee as 
directed, and record your total profits on the last row on the page]. Subsequent periods 
should be recorded similarly. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO SELLERS 
During each market period you are free to sell to any buyer or buyers as many 
units as you might want. The first unit that you sell during- a trading- period you obtain at 
a cost of the amount listed on the enclosed sheet in row (2) marked Buyback Cost under 
Unit Number l; if you sell a second unit you incur the additional cost listed in row (5) 
marked Buyback Cost under Unit Number 2, etc. The profits from each sale (which are 
yours to keep) are computed by taking the difference between the transaction revenue, or 
price at which you sold the unit, and the cost of the unit. That is, 
[your earnings= (transaction revenue) - (buyback cost)]. 
Suppose, for example, your buyback cost of the first unit is 140 and your cost of ti}� 
second unit is 160. For illustrative purposes we will consider only a two-unit case. If 
you sell the first unit at 200 and the second unit at 190, your earnings are: 
earnings from first = 200 - 140 = 60 
earnings from second = 190 - 160 = 30 
total earnings = 60 + 30 = 90 
The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. The sale price of the first unit 
you sell during the first period should be recorded on row (1) at the time of sale. You 
should then record the profits on this sale as directed on row (3). [At the end of the 
period record your total number of postings, find the posting fee as directed], and record 
your total profits on the last row on the page. Subsequent periods should be recorded 
similarly. 
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Transaction Record for Buyer#_ 
1 Unit Number 1 
Period 
}••''''""" .......................................................................... ................... . 
1 1 Redemption Value 
; ......... � ... Ir.�§��.��Q� .. �Q§L ................................ .................. .. 
! 3 Profit (line 1 - 2) 
Unit Number 2
l. ........ 1. ... g���!!.1.P.J!Q!.J:.Y.aj�� ............................... ................... . 
f 5 Transaction Cost 
1 ......... § . .. �!?.f.��.rn.�£.4 .. �}>. .................................... ................... . 
. Unit Number 3 , ......... ::; "i�<l��·j;1i�� .. v�1��· .............................. .................. .. 
1 8 Transaction Cost )o•••••••••••• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••ooo•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••unouo oo•••••oooooooooo••• 
1 9 Profit (line 7 - 8) 
............. .......................................................................... .................... 
1 ..... )� ... !'!:9.n�.(�.��.�J9..�..J�L ........................... ................... . 
. Unit Number 5 } ............ .......................................................................... ................... . 
1 13 Redemption Value l····· .. i1 ... ��i��iI��Vi:·�fa) ................................................. . 
Unit Number 6
L ... J9. ... g�.�£!!.1.P..��2� .. Y.���£ ............................... ................... . 
f 17 Transaction Cost 
1
...... !.� . .. �!?.f.�t.m��.}9. .. :J7.L ............................ ................... . 
Unit Number 7 : ............ .......................................................................... ................... . 
! 19 Redemption Value 
1 20 Transaction Cost >············ ·········································································· ···················· 
i 21 Profit (line 19 - 20) 
............. .......................................................................... .................... 
, Unit Number 8
L. .... �� . .. �����P.�i!?!.! . .Y.���� ................................ .................. .. 
1 23 Transaction Cost 
! ..... ..?.� ... !'!:9.f�HY�.�.�� .. � .. �.?.2 .............................. ................... . 
. Unit Number 9 } ............ .......................................................................... ................... . 
1 25 Redemption Value
L. .... �.?. ... g�.Q�.�.P..�!.9.� .. Y.��.�� ................................ ................... . 
1 29 Transaction Cost 
.... J.9 . .. �2.f.�tJF.��.}?. .. : .. ?.�L ............................ .................. .. 
! ...... .?.J . ... $..�.� . .Rr.9.n.�.n.��.��}.:±-.. § . . ±.2..± .. ::: ..... ................... .
L ..... }� . .. Nµ,.!!.1.!?.�r..2.LP.9.§��·g·� .. Q?.9.�L ............. ................... . 
1 33 Posting Fee (line 32 x ) 
Postings 
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Table 1 
Experiments and Conditions 
Experiment Condition Location Experience Number Number 
of Subjects of Subjects of Periods 
013194 Costly CIT General 6 12 
Offer Experienced 
021794 Costly CIT General 6 10 
Off er Experienced 
050394 Free CIT General 6 10 
Offer Experienced 
050694 Free CIT General 6 10 
Offer Experienced 
052494 Free CIT General 6 10 
Offer Experienced 
053094* Costly CIT General 6 10 
Offer Experienced 
*This experiment was interrupted briefly by a computer shutdown
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� 
u 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Table 2-a 
Period 1 Redemption Values and Costs 
by Subject Type 
Buyer Redemption Values Seller Costs 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
585 575 555 425 435 455 
535 565 545 475 445 465 
515 495 525 495 515 485 
490 475 515 520 535 495 
435 425 480 575 585 530 
400 405 465 610 605 545 
340 375 430 670 635 580 
315 335 410 695 675 600 
305 295 375 705 715 635 
280 265 340 730 745 670 
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f-1 
00 
Period 
Amount 
Added 
1 
0 
Table 2-b 
Amount Added to Entries in Table 2-a to Obtain Corresponding Schedules for All Periods 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
-40 -200 -120 80 120 -40 -120 -320 -240 -280 -360 
*First experiment only
Table 3
Expected Equilibrium Prices 
By Period 
Period Price 
0 505 
(Practice) 
1 505 
2 465 
3 305 
4 385 
5 585 
6 625 
7 465 
8 385 
9 185 
10 265 
11* 225 
12* 145 
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Table 4 
Estimated Parameters for theAshenfelter /El-Gamal Model 
- Free Offer: 
B,, B,, B,, B� 
Competitive 
Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 
Prediction 
Estimated -22.7 -2.0 -14.7 9.7 
Coefficient 
Standard 7.4 7.4 7.4 2.4 
Error 
Number of Observations 30 
0.41 
Corrected r2 0.34 
rho -0.01 
Costly Offer: 
B,, B,, B,. B, 
Competitive 
Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 
Prediction 
Estimated -28.5 7.6 -32.1 -0.46 
Coefficient 
Standard 9.9 9.6 9.6 3.3 
Error 
Number of Observations 30 
0.45 
Corrected r2 0.39 
rho 0.21 
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Table 5
Volumes by Period 
Experiment 
Period Free Offer Costly Offer 
0503 0506 0524 0131 0217 0530 
1 9 9 11 7 7 6 
2 9 8 9 8 7 8 
3 9 11* 10 9 9 11 
4 9 9 9 8 8 9 
5 9 9 9 8 6 9 
6 8 9 9 8 7 6 
7 9 9 9 8 7 
--
6 
8 9 8 9 7 7 8 
9 9 9 9 8 8 8 
10 9 9 9 8 9 8 
Average 9.1 7.8 
*Suspected type 
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Table 6
Efficiencies by Period 
Experiment 
Period Free Offer Costly Offer 
0503 0506 0524 0131 0217 0530 
1 100% 100% 97.3% 89.2% 91.9% 82.4% 
2 100% 91.9% 93.9% 84.5% 93.2% 86.5% 
4 100% 100% 100% 97.3% 97.3% 97.3% 
5 100% 100% 100% 97.3% 85.1% 100% 
6 97.3% 100% 100% 97.3% 91.9% 82.4% 
7 100% 100% 100% 97.3% 94.6% 77.0% 
8 100% 97.3% 100% 82.4% 86.5% 97.3% 
10 100% 100% 100% 97.3% 100% 97.3% 
Average 97.2% 91.9% 
*Suspected typo
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Table 7
Estimated Parameters for Speed of Convergence 
Free Offer: 
Competitive Equilibrium 
Prediction 
Estimated Coefficient 
Standard Error 
Number of Observations 
Corrected r2 
rho 
Costly Offer: 
Competitive Equilibrium 
Prediction 
Estimated Coefficient 
Standard Error 
Number of Observations 
Corrected r2 
rho 
IP.. - Pq .. I = ae-�1+e IJt IJ 
0 
17.2 
0.14* 
0 
13.3 
0.14* 
*Actually the standard error is 0.14 out of In 17.2 = 2.84
0.14 out of In 13.3 = 2.58 
272 
0.33 
0.32 
0.58 
233 
0.24 
0.23 
0.51 
B 
0.12 
0.019 
B 
0.05 
0.023 
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Table 8
Number of Offers, Average Quantity Offered, and Average Contract Size by Period 
Period Free Offer 
0503 0506 
1 53,1.0,1.0 64,1.1,1.l 
2 . 54,1.1,1.0 74,1.1,1.0 
3 60,1.2,1.0 48,1.2,1.1 
4 51,1.0,1.0 61,1.3,1.0 
5 48,1.1,1.0 57,1.3,1.0 
6 58,1.0,1.0 59,1.3,1.0 
7 35,1.0,1.0 64,1.1,1.0 
8 53,1.0,1.0 61,1.2,1.0 
9 56,1.1,1.0 48.1.2,1.0 
10 25,1.3,1.0 53,1.3,1.0 
Average 50.5, 1.2, 1.02 
0524 
57,1.4,1.0 
45,1.2,1.0 
37,1.6,1.0 
46,1.3,1.0 
48,1.3,1.0 
44,1.4,1.0 
32,1.3,1.1 
47.1.6.1.0 
48,1.5,1.0 
38,1.7,1.1 
Experiment 
Costly Offer 
0131 0217 0530 
19,1.3,1.0 9,2.7,1.2 8,1.5,1.0 
13,1.3,1.1 12,1.8,1.0 10,2.2,1.0 
16,1.6,1.1 9,2.3,1.1 6,3.2,1.0 
11,1.8,1.1 8,2.1,1.0 6,2.3,1.1 
12,1.8,1.0 9,1.6,1.2 5,3.0,1.0 
10,1.3,1.0 7,2.1,1.0 5,1.6,1.0 
9,1.4,1.0 9,2.4,1.0 4,2.5,1.0 
11.1.8,1.0 7,1.7,1.0 6,2.3,1.0 
8,1.8,1.0 8,1.9,1.0 5,2.0,1.0 
11,1.5,1.0 5,2.8,1.1 11,1.8,1.0 
9.0, 1.9, 1.03 
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Period 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Average 
Table 9 
Number of Seconds Remaining and Number of Subsequent Offers 
for the Last Transaction in a Period 
0503 
6,1 
3,0 
9,2 
15,2 
6,1 
15,2 
2,0 
10,3 
60,7 
9,2 
Free Offer 
0506 
2,0 
36,4 
157,4 
2,0 
109,18 
16,3 
17,4 
2,1 
7,1 
1,0 
21.1 seconds 
2.8 offers 
0524 
23,7 
59,7 
5,1 
5,1 
14,4 
8,2 
6,3 
2,0 
21,3 
8,2 
Experiment 
Costly Offer 
0131 
1,0 
1,0 
124,2 
115,1 
152,2 
57,1 
117,2 
145,1 
174,1 
1,0 
0217 
150,2 
133,3 
15,0 
52,1 
33,1 
3,0 
51,0 
16,0 
55,0 
1,0 
73.5 seconds 
0.7 offers 
0530 
11,0 
9,0 
12,0 
179,1 
165,0 
17,0 
220,0 
48,0 
101,1 
48,2 
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Contract Prices Experiment 0217 with Free Offers 
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